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Abstract
Anomaly-based intrusion detection (AID) techniques are useful for de-
tecting novel intrusions into computing resources. One of the most suc-
cessful AID detectors proposed to date is stide, which is based on analysis
of system call sequences. In this paper, we present a detailed formal
framework to analyze, understand and improve the performance of stide
and similar AID techniques. Several important properties of stide-like
detectors are established through formal proofs, and validated by care-
fully conducted experiments using test datasets. Finally, the framework
is utilized to design two applications to improve the cost and performance
of stide-like detectors which are based on sequence analysis. The first
application reduces the cost of developing AID detectors by identifying
the critical sections in the training dataset, and the second application
identifies the intrusion context in the intrusive dataset, that helps to fine-
tune the detectors. Such fine-tuning in turn helps to improve detection
rate and reduce false alarm rate, thereby increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of the intrusion detectors.
1 Introduction
Since the concept of intrusion detection in computer systems was proposed by
Anderson [1], many research studies have been carried out to find appropriate in-
trusion detection techniques to protect the resources in computers or networks
[20] [14] [18] [3]. However, the network disaster caused recently by Nimda,
MSBlast and MSSasser highlights the shortcomings of the intrusion detection
techniques deployed in our network infrastructures [13], and indicates that in-
trusion detection techniques still have a long way to go before they can provide
effective protection to computing resources.
In general, the intrusion detection techniques can be categorized into signature-
based intrusion detection (SID) and anomaly-based intrusion detection (AID)
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ones. The SID techniques build (and/or update) intrusion signature bases that
include the signature of every known intrusion. Then, the resource behavior
that matches any intrusion signature in the bases is labeled as an intrusion.
Obviously, previously unknown intrusions cannot be detected by this technique.
Besides this drawback, the requirement of instant updating of the intrusion
signature bases imposes a severe performance bottleneck on SID techniques.
Anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques have become a focus of intense
research as they offer an useful alternative to SID, that is capable of detecting
novel intrusions. One of their implicit assumptions is that the violations or
anomalies are indications of intrusions, i.e. the anomaly is caused by an intrusion
into the resource. This assumption, though largely correct, may not be always
true as some malicious intrusions may not violate the parameters of normal
behaviors, whereas some non-malicious activities may appear as violations [26].
Almost all AID techniques work as follows. First, a model of normally
behaving users [11] [12] and/or processes [9] [18] is built. Then, an intrusion is
detected by comparing the actual current behavior against the normal model
and taking actions according to some predetermined security policies [3] [4]
[21]. Although many AID techniques have been proposed to date, no single
AID technique can effectively detect all types of intrusions into the resources
under various scenarios [13]. More specifically, they suffer from high false alarm
rate that tends to reduce the effectiveness of true alarms because of the base
rate fallacy [2]. In addition, the high cost of and insufficient guideline about
training the normal model do not make matters any better for AID.
In this paper, instead of proposing a new AID technique, we develop a for-
mal framework to argue about and analyze the properties of one typical AID
technique called stide [7] [6]. Generally speaking, to be efficient, any AID tech-
nique must try to increase the detection rate simultaneously keeping the false
alarm rate to a minimum. For this reason, it is important to understand the
factors that suppress the detection rate, and lead to false alarms. In this frame-
work for stide, the factors are identified as the minimum foreign sequences in
the intrusive dataset and the maximum self sequences in the test dataset, and
the relations between these factors and stide efficiency are expressed and dis-
cussed. In addition, most related works to stide are interpreted in a logical way
under this framework, namely, mimicry attacks, information hiding techniques,
t-stide, variable-length patterns, and locality frame scheme.
Our aim in this paper is just that, and we do so by providing a useful formal-
ism that not only helps in our understanding of the underlying dynamics among
various factors (e.g. the influence of the completeness of the training dataset,
the complexity of processes etc.), but also provides a practical guideline as to
how to develop efficient training procedures for AID detectors to make train-
ing faster and how to identify the intrusion context in the intrusive dataset to
study intrusion characteristics. Contradictory to our general concept that more
training audit trails will lead to more efficient stide detectors, the experimental
result show that there are critical sections in the training audit trails, which
are important to stide efficiency. Our trimming scheme is to find such critical
sections in the training audit trails. Ultimately, the framework gives guidelines
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for selecting stide for intrusion detection (i.e., what are the applicable scenar-
ios of stide). Though our discussion is based on stide, the framework provides
insights that are more generally applicable to any sequence analysis based AID
technique.
Related work. Sequence time-delay embedding or (stide), was first proposed
by Forrest et al [6] for privileged Unix processes. The method is an instance
of a computer immunology system to protect the computer systems using the
principles of natural immune systems. However, throughout the series of papers
by Forrest et al [9] [22] [28], there is this “magic number 6” [19] which is empiri-
cally determined to be the length of stide detectors to obtain effective detection
of all anomalies in intrusive datasets. This so called ‘Why six?’ problem [24]
for stide has stimulated a lot of research [15] [25]. Finally, Tan et al. [25] [24]
showed that the correct answer to the problem lies in the fact that the lower
bound on the stide detector length is determined by the length of the minimum
foreign sequence(s) in the intrusive dataset.
However, Tan et al. [25] fell short of providing a comprehensive framework
that systematically analyzes the interactions among various factors affecting
the operational limits of stide detectors. In particular, it fails to establish the
effects of incompleteness of the training dataset on the effectiveness of stide.
Though it is generally understood that more completeness of the training audit
trails leads to higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate, a quantitative
relationship among them is not available in the literatures. In practice, even
though there exist some techniques to generate near-complete training dataset
[5], it is worth studying the effect of the completeness of the training dataset on
the performance of stide detectors for the following reasons:
1. It is difficult to collect a complete training dataset even with the completeness-
guarantee techniques;
2. The existing completeness-guarantee techniques are only specific for the
system-call-based events in a host. However, as a general technique, stide
is not only applicable to system call sequences in a host, but also other
event sequences in diverse environments, such as networks;
3. In a converse manner, the knowledge of the precise influence of the com-
pleteness of the training dataset on the efficiency of stide detectors will be
useful to propose or improve completeness-guarantee techniques;
4. The‘concept drifting’ problem in the normal model for anomaly-based in-
trusion detection tends to make the normal model always incomplete;
5. Most important of all, the tradeoff between the completeness of the train-
ing dataset and the efficiency of the stide detector needs to be quantified.
It is a common sense that, as the training dataset approaches more com-
pleteness, more efforts are needed to achieve any information gain. Fur-
thermore, it is possible that the efficiency loss due to the incompleteness
will be made up by modeling generalization.
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Contributions of this paper. The main contributions are summarized below:
• A formal framework is proposed to determine the operational limits for
stide-like AID detectors. Under the framework, the other techniques re-
lated to stide, namely, mimicry attacks, information hiding techniques,
variable length patterns, t-stide and locality frame, are interpreted in a
logical way.
• Under the framework, a comprehensive solution to the ‘Why six?’ problem
is achieved, which extends the one presented by Tan et al. [24][25].
• The influence of the completeness of the training dataset on stide efficiency
is evaluated.
• A methodology is derived from the formal framework for trimming the
training data for a specific detection performance by identifying and elim-
inating non-critical sections since they yield no additional information
gain. This saves both training time and space for storing training data.
• A scheme for identifying the intrusion context is proposed, and several use-
ful findings from the minimum foreign sequences in the intrusive dataset
are reported, at least for AID techniques based on sequence analysis.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the notations
and definitions to help the readers in understanding the rest of the paper. In
section 3, stide is briefly introduced and expressed formally. The performance
measures such as the effectiveness, completeness and efficiency of an anomaly-
based intrusion detector are defined and several theorems on them are presented
and proved in section 4. In addition, the operational limits for stide detectors are
determined. In section 5, the influence of the completeness of training dataset
on stide efficiency is evaluated, and then the intrusion context identification
scheme is proposed and evaluated using a typical dataset. In the last section,
conclusions are drawn and future work on our framework is discussed.
2 Notations and Definitions
2.1 Notations
Sequences and Sequence Sets: Let Σ denote the dataset for a process, which
consists of event logs with the identity of the associated running process. A
sequence S in Σ is an event series constituted by contiguous events in Σ with
the same process identity, and its length is denoted as |S|. Specially, φ is a
sequence with length 0, and Σ itself is a sequence as well. SS(Σ, l) denotes
the set of all the sequences of length l (l > 0), which are collected from Σ.
Thus, SS(Σ, 0) = {φ}. Furthermore, SS(Σ) =
⋃+∞
l=0 SS(Σ, l). In any subset
of SS′(Σ) ⊂ SS(Σ), |SS′|min(Σ)
1 is the minimum length of all sequences in
1We use the notation |...| to represent the length of any member sequence in a sequence
set, instead of its size.
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SS′(Σ), and SS′min(Σ) consists of the sequences with length |SS
′|min(Σ) in
SS′(Σ). As a special case, |SS′|min(Σ) = 0 if φ ∈ SS
′
min(Σ), and |SS|min(Σ) =
1.
Example 1 Suppose Σ = abc. ab is a sequence in Σ with length 2, SS(Σ, 2) =
{ab, bc}, and SS(Σ) = {φ, a, b, c, ab, bc,
abc}. For a subset SS′(Σ) = {b, c, ab, abc}, |SS′|min(Σ) = 1 and SS
′
min(Σ) =
{b, c}
Set Operations: For given datasets Σ1 and Σ2 of a process and corresponding
sequence sets SS(Σ1, l) and SS(Σ2, l), the set operations (∪,∩,−) are defined
as follows (l > 0):
(1) SS(Σ1, l) ∪ SS(Σ2, l)
= {S|(S ∈ SS(Σ1, l)) ∨ (S ∈ SS(Σ2, l))}
(2) SS(Σ1, l) ∩ SS(Σ2, l)
= {S|(S ∈ SS(Σ1, l)) ∧ (S ∈ SS(Σ2, l))}
(3) SS(Σ1, l)− SS(Σ2, l)
= {S|(S ∈ SS(Σ1, l)) ∧ (S 6∈ SS(Σ2, l))}
In addition, Σ1 ⊙Σ2 is a special concatenation of the datasets Σ1 and Σ2, such
that there is no sequence in SS(Σ1 ⊙Σ2, l), in which some events belong to Σ1
and other events belong to Σ1. This is because the process identity in Σ1 is
different from that in Σ2. Therefore, SS(Σ1 ⊙ Σ2, l) = SS(Σ1, l) ∪ SS(Σ2, l).
Example 2 Suppose that Σ1 = abc and Σ2 = ab. SS(Σ1,
2) = {ab, bc}, and SS(Σ2, 2) = {ab}. Thus, the set operations SS(Σ1, 2) ∪
SS(Σ2, 2) = {ab, bc}, SS(Σ1, 2)∩SS(Σ2, 2) = {ab}, and SS(Σ1, 2)−SS(Σ2, 2) =
{bc}. Σ1 ⊙ Σ2 = abc; ab.
Supersequence and Subsequence: If Ssub is a contiguous subsequence of S
and |S| − |Ssub| = k, then Ssub is said to be a k-order subsequence of S, and
denoted as Ssub 4k S. Similarly, Ssup <k S denotes that Ssup is a k-order
supersequence in which S is a contiguous subsequence, and |Ssub| − |S| = k. It
is worth noting that φ 4|S| S, and S <|S| φ. For example, ab 41 abc, a 42 abc
and ab <1 a. In addition, the terms subsequence and supersequence will always
imply contiguity in this paper, such that ac 641 abc.
2.2 Definitions
Central to our framework are the twin concepts of theminimum foreign sequence
– MFS, and the maximum self sequence – MSS. Their definitions, expressions
and relation are given below.
2.2.1 Foreign sequences and self sequences
Let Σref be the reference dataset, and Σtgt be the target dataset. For any
sequence S ∈ SS(Σtgt), if S is also in SS(Σref ), S will be called a self sequence,
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otherwise, it is a foreign sequence to Σref . Furthermore, FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ) is
defined as the set of foreign sequences of Σtgt w.r.t. Σref . Similarly, the set of
self sequences is defined as SELF (Σtgt|
Σref ). Mathematically,
FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ) = ∪
+∞
l=1 SS(Σtgt, l)− SS(Σref , l) (1)
SELF (Σtgt|Σref ) = ∪
+∞
l=1 SS(Σtgt, l) ∩ SS(Σref , l) (2)
Thus, FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ) ∪ SELF (Σtgt|Σref ) = SS(Σtgt).
A sequence S in FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ) will be called a minimum foreign se-
quence (MFS) [25] if none of its subsequences is in FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ), i.e. all
of its subsequences are in SELF (Σtgt|Σref ). The set of all minimum foreign
sequences is denoted as MFS(Σtgt|Σref ). On the other hand, for any sequence
S in SELF (Σtgt|Σref ), if there exists one 1-order supersequence that is not
included in SELF (Σtgt|Σref ) (i.e., it is in FRGN(Σtgt|Σref )), then it will be
called a maximum self sequence (MSS). The set of all maximum self sequences
is denoted as MSS(Σtgt|Σref ). Formally, they can be expressed as:
MFS(Σtgt|Σref )
={S|∀S(S ∈ FRGN(Σtgt|Σref )) ∧ (∀S
′∀k(S′ ∈ SS(Σtgt))
∧(S′ 4k S → S
′ 6∈ FRGN(Σtgt|Σref )))} (3)
MSS(Σtgt|Σref )
={S|∀S(S ∈ SELF (Σtgt|Σref )) ∧ (∃S
′(S′ ∈ SS(Σtgt))
∧(S′ <1 S) ∧ (S
′ 6∈ SELF (Σtgt|Σref )))} (4)
From these definitions, MFS(Σtgt|Σref ) ⊂ SS(Σtgt) and MSS(Σtgt|Σref ) ⊂
SS(Σtgt). Furthermore, based on above notations, |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) > 1,
|MSS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) > 0. Specially, ifMFS(Σtgt|Σref ) = Φ, |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) =
+∞. The same property can be applied to MSS(Σtgt|Σref ).
Example 3 Suppose that Σref = abc, Σtgt = abaa. The sequence sets of these
two datasets are: SS(Σref ) = {φ, a, b, c,
ab, bc, abc}, SS(Σtgt) = {φ, a, b, ab, ba, aa, aba, baa, abaa}. Next,
FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ) = {ba, aa, aba, baa, abaa}
SELF (Σtgt|Σref ) = {φ, a, b, ab}
Finally, we can deduce:
MFS(Σtgt|Σref ) = {ba, aa}
MSS(Σtgt|Σref ) = {a, b, ab}
MFSmin(Σtgt|Σref ) = {ba, aa}
MSSmin(Σtgt|Σref ) = {a, b}
|MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) = 2
|MSS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) = 1
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2.2.2 Relation between MFS and MSS
One relationship between MFSs and MSSs of two datasets Σref and Σtgt is
given by the following theorem2.
Theorem 1 For two datasets Σref and Σtgt of a process, the following relation
holds.
|MSS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) = |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref )− 1 (5)
Example 4 In Example 3, it is obvious that
|MSS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) = |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref )− 1 = 1.
3 A formal description of stide
In the experimental setup for stide [6] [28], there are two datasets for every
process, the normal dataset Σnml, and the intrusive dataset Σint, which are
defined below.
Definition 1 (Normal Dataset) The normal dataset is a dataset Σnml that
is utilized to train the normal model of a process for stide, and it MUST be
collected in the normal run of the process without any intrusion.
Definition 2 (Intrusive Dataset) The intrusive dataset Σint is a dataset that
is collected when one or more intrusions were occurring during the runs of a
process.
In terms of these two datasets from the same process, stide can be formally
described as follows. Let ω(> 1) denote the size of the detector window. In the
modeling phase, the normal model of the process is obtained as: SS(Σnml, ω).
Then, in the detecting phase, the foreign sequences in the intrusive dataset Σint,
FS(Σint|Σnml, ω), are enumerated:
FS(Σint|Σnml, ω) = SS(Σint, ω)− SS(Σnml, ω)
If FS(Σint|Σnml, ω) 6= Φ, the intrusion(s) in the intrusive dataset Σint can be
detected with the detector length ω [9] [10] [19] [25] [28]3. It is evident that
the sequence set FS(Σint|Σnml, ω) is strongly related to MFS(Σint|Σnml) via
|MFS|min(Σint|Σnml):
|MFS|min(Σint|Σnml) 6 ω ⇔ FS(Σint|Σnml, ω) 6= Φ (6)
2To save space, all proofs of the theorems in this paper are provided in our (extended)
technical report [16] at http://www.cais.ntu.edu.sg/home/technical reports 2004.jsp.
3It is notable that most of these research studies only apply stide to system-call based
sequences in a host as does the original proposal for stide[9]. However, in principle, stide
is applicable to other environments as well. Therefore, in our formal framework, it will not
be specific for any environment, which is also one of our objectives to formalize the stide
technique.
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In its formal proposal [9], a Locality Frame Count (LFC) function is applied
to smooth the noise, or to filter the false alarms in the process by summing
up the number of foreign sequences found within the span of a locality frame.
However, the LFC function does not add to or compensate for the detecting
ability, or failure/shortcoming of the stide detector, and it will not be used in
our framework. As an application of our framework, it will be interpreted later.
Practically, even though the underlying principle is very simple, stide can
detect most of the intrusions into the processes (the datasets from UNM [8]).
For this reason, it is accepted as a typical and effective anomaly-based intrusion
detector in many research studies.
4 A formal framework for stide
In general, the efficiency of an intrusion detection technique is determined by
both false positives [2] and false negatives. The incompleteness of the normal
model is well-known as the main cause for the false positives in an AID detector
[17] [2]. However, in most of the research studies on stide [6] [25], the complete-
ness is not adequately considered when evaluating the efficiency of stide detec-
tors. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that the normal dataset is
complete in the sense that it includes all the normal behaviors of a process. As
a result, the issue of false positives has been completely ignored. However, as
indicated in the first section, such completeness of the normal dataset is difficult
to verify, and there is no effective method to guarantee it.
In our framework, the implicit assumption about the completeness of the
normal dataset is discarded, and the normal dataset is regarded as the training
dataset Σtrn to build the known normal model of the resource. At the same time,
a test dataset Σtst is introduced to evaluate the completeness of the training
dataset Σtrn. The function of the test dataset is to evaluate the ability of
the detector to correctly identify normal data as such without generating false
positives. Thus, the test dataset must be collected during a normal run of
a process without any intrusion as well. To some extent, our methodology
corresponds to the actual scenarios where it is difficult to collect all the normal
behaviors of a computing resource, and there are always false positives when the
normal behaviors of the process are examined by an AID detector. In addition,
without loss of generality, we assume that the audit trails in Σint is caused by
only one intrusion.
4.1 A critical look at stide performance
In our formal framework for stide, with the detector window size ω, the normal
model SS(Σtrn, ω) is first gleaned from Σtrn. Based on its detection results
on Σtst and Σint, all the sequences are classified as follows. The outcome of
a detection process can be divided into four categories depending on the true
nature of the data and the correctness of the detection result. These are shown in
Table 1. Therefore, according to whether a sequence matches the normal model
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Table 1: Four detection scenarios.
intrusive sequence normal sequence
alarm True Positive False Positive
non-alarm False Negative True Negative
SS(Σtrn, ω), SS(Σtst, ω) can be split into two subsets: False Positive Sequence
Set (denoted as FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω)), and True Negative Sequence Set (denoted
as TNSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω)). Similarly, depending on the detection outcome, the
intrusive sequence set SS(Σint, ω) can be split into two subsets: False Negative
Sequence Set (denoted as FNSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω)), and True Positive Sequence Set
(denoted as TPSS(Σint|Σtrn,
ω)). Using our earlier notations, we can write the following definitions of the
above four sequence subsets:
FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω) = SS(Σtst, ω)− SS(Σtrn, ω)
TNSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω) = SS(Σtst, ω) ∩ SS(Σtrn, ω)
TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω) = SS(Σint, ω)− SS(Σtrn, ω)
FNSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω) = SS(Σint, ω) ∩ SS(Σtrn, ω)
Furthermore,
FRGN(Σint|Σtrn) = ∪
+∞
ω=1 TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω)
SELF (Σint|Σtrn) = ∪
+∞
ω=1 FNSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω)
FRGN(Σtst|Σtrn) = ∪
+∞
ω=1 FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω)
SELF (Σtst|Σtrn) = ∪
+∞
ω=1 TNSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω)
Next, according to the sequences in these four categories, we will define two
aspects of stide performance, namely effectiveness and completeness. Finally,
we will give the definitions and conditions for an efficient stide detector.
4.1.1 Effectiveness of a stide detector
Definition 3 (Effectiveness) A stide detector with detector window ω is ef-
fective to detect the intrusion in Σint if there is at least one sequence in the
intrusive sequence set SS(Σint, ω), which is detected as a true positive, i.e.,
TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω) 6= Φ.
To detect an intrusion effectively, the relation between stide detector window
size ω and the intrusion characteristics is critical to choose a proper ω for stide,
and it is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let us assume that there are a training dataset Σtrn and an intru-
sive dataset Σint of a process. A stide detector of length ω, built from Σtrn, is
effective w.r.t. Σint, iff
ω > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) (7)
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Example 5 Suppose that Σtrn = aba, and Σint = ababa. Then,MFSmin(Σint|Σtrn) =
{bab}, and |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
= 3. As SS(Σint, 1) = SS(Σtrn, 1) = {a, b}, and SS(Σint, 2) = SS(Σtrn, 2) =
{ab, ba}, TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, 1) = Φ and TPSS
(Σint|Σtrn, 2) = Φ. But TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, 3) = {bab} 6= Φ Thus, only if ω ≥ 3,
the intrusion in Σint will be detected by stide effectively.
Note that Theorem 2 merely summarizes the conclusion of Tan et al. [25], but
in our framework, it is rather straightforward to prove its validity.
4.1.2 Completeness of a stide detector
Definition 4 (Completeness) A stide detector with detector window ω is
complete if the underlying normal model built from a training dataset Σtrn is
complete. In other words, the sequence subsets TNSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω) = SS(Σtst, ω),
and thus FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω) = Φ.
Due to the base-rate fallacy [2], the completeness of a stide detector is also
critical for its application. The following theorem establishes the conditions for
the completeness of a stide detector in terms of the detector window size ω.
Theorem 3 Let us assume that there are a training dataset Σtrn and a test
dataset Σtst of a process. A stide detector of length ω, built from Σtrn, is
complete w.r.t. Σtst, iff
ω 6 |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) (8)
Example 6 Suppose that Σtrn = aba, and Σtst = baba. Then,MSSmin(Σtst|Σtrn) =
{ba, ab}, and |MSS|min(Σtst|
Σtrn) = 2. As SS(Σtst, 1) = SS(Σtrn, 1) = {a, b}, and SS(Σtst, 2) = SS(Σtrn, 2) =
{ab, ba}, FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, 1) = Φ, and FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, 2) = Φ. On the other
hand, FPSS
(Σtst|Σtrn, 3) = {bab} 6= Φ. Thus, only if ω ≤ 2, the stide detector built from
Σtrn is complete w.r.t Σtst.
Corollary 1 For a training dataset Σtrn and a test dataset Σtst of a process, if
|MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) = 0, there are no complete stide detectors built from Σtrn
w.r.t. Σtst.
4.1.3 Efficient stide detectors
Definition 5 (Efficiency) A stide detector with detector window size ω is ef-
ficient w.r.t Σtst and Σint if it is effective to detect the intrusion in Σint, and
it is complete in detecting Σtst.
It is easy to conclude that an efficient stide detector will not produce any false
positives when analyzing Σtst, and it will produce true positives when analyzing
Σint. We are now in a position to state the condition for a stide detector to be
efficient, which is expressed by the following theorem.
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Theorem 4 Given a training dataset Σtrn, a test dataset Σtst, and an intrusive
dataset Σint, a stide detector with the detection window size ω, obtained using
Σtrn, is efficient w.r.t. Σtst and Σint iff
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) 6 ω 6 |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) (9)
Proof 1 It can be inferred from Theorem 2 and 3.
Example 7 Suppose that Σtrn = aba, Σtst = baba, and Σint = abc. Then,
MSSmin(Σtst|Σtrn) = {ba, ab}, andMFS(Σint|Σtrn) = {c}, thus |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) =
2 and |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) = 1. For a stide detector with length ω, to be com-
plete, ω ≤ 2, and to be effective, ω ≥ 1. Finally, we can get 1 ≤ ω ≤ 2.
Efficient and Inefficient Areas for stide Detectors
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Figure 1: Efficient and inefficient areas for stide detectors on the training dataset
Σtrn.
Figure 1 shows the area determined byMFSmin(Σint|Σtrn) andMSSmin(Σtst|Σtrn)
where efficient stide detectors must belong. If the point determined by |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
and |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) is in the efficient area, it is possible to find one or more
efficient stide detector(s). Otherwise, no efficient stide detector can be found.
Note that, there is one undefined area since |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) > 1.
The following corollary, drawn from the above theorem, explicitly defines
the operational limits of a stide detector.
Corollary 2 For a training dataset Σtrn, a test dataset Σtst, and an intrusive
dataset Σint of a process, the following hold:
(a). If |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) < |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn), there are no efficient
stide detectors w.r.t. Σtst and Σint.
(b). With a detector window ω, if ω > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn), and ω > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn),
the stide detector built by Σtrn is effective, but not efficient w.r.t. Σtst and
Σint.
(c). With a detector window ω, if ω 6 |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn), and ω 6 |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn),
the stide detector built by Σtrn is complete, but not efficient w.r.t. Σtst
and Σint.
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4.2 Completeness of the training dataset vs. stide effi-
ciency
From their definitions, MFS(Σint|Σtrn) and MSS(Σtst|Σtrn) will be affected
by the completeness of the training dataset to a large extent. Therefore, accord-
ing to Theorem 4, the completeness of the training dataset is critical to stide
efficiency. In Figure 2, the universe of all possible sequences is referred to as
U
Known Normal Model
from Training Dataset
Unknown
Normal Model
(from Any
Test Dataset)
Space for Anomalous/
Intrusive Behaviors
Figure 2: Behavior spaces for stide: the known and unknown normal behavior
models, and the intrusive behavior space.
U , in which the known and unknown normal models are only complementary
parts of the complete normal model. Outside the complete normal model is the
intrusive behavior space for the known and unknown intrusions. However, in
stide, all the sequences from the training dataset are regarded as normal (in the
known normal model), and other sequences lying outside the training dataset
are considered anomalous. Obviously, the unknown normal model is critical for
its efficiency. Thus, in our following analysis, we assume that the test dataset
Σtst incorporates the whole unknown normal model (Figure 2). Even though
the assumption can not be achieved in the real deployment, it is reasonable in
analyzing stide efficiency. Given this framework, let’s examine the scenario in
which stide is suitable for detecting the intrusions into a resource.
4.2.1 MSSs in the test dataset
Based on Equation 3, MSS(Σtst|Σtrn) is deduced as:
MSS(Σtst|Σtrn)
= {S|∀S(S ∈ SELF (Σtst|Σtrn)) ∧ (∃S
′(S′ ∈ SS(Σtst))
∧(S′ <1 S) ∧ (S
′ 6∈ SELF (Σtst|Σtrn)))}
= {S|∀S(S ∈ SELF (Σtst|Σtrn)) ∧ (∃S
′(S′ ∈ SS(Σtst))
∧(S′ <1 S) ∧ (S
′ ∈ FRGN(Σtst|Σtrn)))}
Thus, MSS(Σtst|Σtrn) is affected by FRGN(Σtst|Σtrn), which is in the un-
known normal model (Figure 2). Theoretically, for any Σtrn and Σtst, if Σtrn is
not complete, |MSS|min(Σtst|
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Σtrn) can vary from 0 to +∞ (Note: +∞ here indicates a potentially large
number bounded by the length of the dataset Σtst).
4.2.2 MFSs in the intrusive dataset
Let’s first define one more concept in our framework:
Definition 6 The common false positive sequence set in the intrusive dataset
CFPS(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) is:
CFPS(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) = FRGN(Σtst|Σtrn) ∩ SS(Σint)
It is obvious that CFPS(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) ⊂ SS(Σint).
Example 8 Suppose that Σtrn = ljk, Σtst = jkl and Σint = ckl. Based on se-
quence set definition, SS(Σtrn) = {φ, l, j, k, lj, jk, ljk}, SS(Σtst) = {φ, j, k, l, jk, kl, jkl},
and SS(Σint) = {φ, c, k, l, ck, kl, ckl}. Next, we get FRGN(Σtst|
Σtrn) = {kl, jkl}. Therefore,
CFPS(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) = {kl}
|CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) = 2
The following theorem is deduced to determine what affects |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
in our framework.
Theorem 5 For the datasets Σtrn, Σtst, and Σint,
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
= min(|CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn),
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst)) (10)
Example 9 Take the same scenario in example 8. In it, MFSmin(Σint|Σtrn⊙
Σtst) = {c}, and |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst) = 1. Thus, we can determine
that |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
= min{2, 1} = 1, which is correct as MFSmin(Σint|Σtrn) = {c, kl}. On the
other hand, if Σint = jkl, SS(Σint) = SS(Σtst). Thus, CFPS(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) =
{kl, jkl}, MFSmin
(Σint|Σtrn⊙Σtst) = Φ. AsMFSmin(Σint|Σtrn) = {kl}, |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) =
2 = min(2,+∞).
As indicated by the intrusive space in Figure 2, |MFS|min
(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst) reflects the intrusion characteristics in a specific intrusive
dataset Σint, which does not depend on the completeness of the training dataset.
Thus, without regard to the completeness of Σtrn, MFS(Σint|Σtrn ⊙Σtst) and
SS(Σint) will always be stable. According to Theorem 5, if |CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) <
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn⊙Σtst), |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) will be affected through the
set FRGN
(Σtst|Σtrn) as the completeness of the training dataset increases.
In summary, bothMFS(Σint|Σtrn) andMSS(Σtst|Σtrn) are affected by the
completeness of the training dataset Σtrn, i.e. FRGN(Σtst|Σtrn).
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4.2.3 Enhancing efficiency of a stide detector
Theorem 6 Assume that, for a process, the training dataset from which the
known model is built, is Σtrn, the test dataset from which the whole unknown
normal model is built, is Σtst, and the intrusive dataset is Σint. Then, there
exist one or more efficient stide detectors iff
|MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst) (11)
Example 10 Take the two scenarios in examples 8 and 9. If Σint = ckl,
MSSmin(Σtst|Σtrn) = {l, k}, MFSmin(Σint|
Σtrn) = {c}, and MFSmin(Σint|Σtrn⊙Σtst) = {c}. Thus, there exists only one
efficient stide detector with length ω = 1. However, if Σint = jkl,MSSmin(Σtst|Σtrn) =
{l, k}, MFSmin(Σint|Σtrn) = {kl}, and thus, there do not exist efficient stide
detectors. At the same time, asMFSmin(Σint|Σtrn⊙Σtst) = Φ, and |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn⊙
Σtst) = +∞, the above equation in Theorem 6 does not hold.
What the above theorem tells us is that with increasing completeness of the
training dataset, the intrusion characteristics reflected by |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn⊙
Σtst) acts more and more as a threshold for the efficiency of a stide detector.
Therefore, sooner or later, the intrusion must manifest itself in the intrusive
dataset with a finite (reasonably small) length of the MFSs, otherwise, there
will be no efficient stide detector for the intrusion.
The following corollary, which follows from the theorems 6 and 4, emphasizes
the condition to build efficient stide detectors from a training dataset:
Corollary 3 Assume that, for a process, the training dataset from which the
known normal model is built, is Σtrn, the test dataset from which the unknown
normal model is constructed, is Σtst, and the intrusive dataset is Σint. Then,
if |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) < |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst), there are no efficient
stide detectors.
Ideally, if the training dataset Σtrn is complete so that it includes all the
normal behaviors of a process (i.e., for any Σtst, |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) = +∞),
|CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|
Σtrn) = +∞. At the same time, the MFSs in an intrusive dataset Σint, is in
fact MFS(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst), which is the absolutely ideal scenario. Definitely,
under the ideal scenario, there will be efficient stide detectors trained by the
dataset Σtrn.
4.3 Interpretation of related work on stide
Following the publication of stide, several research studies have been published
with criticisms and suggestions of improvement of stide [27] [26] [28] [29]. Under
our proposed framework, they can be interpreted in a logical way to determine
their basic foundations.
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4.3.1 Mimicry attacks and intrusion information hiding
The mimicry attacks are proposed by Wagner to show the weakness of the stide
technique [27]. In a nutshell, the proposed strategies to do mimicry attacks
are: intrusive behavior avoidance; waiting for the intrusive behaviors accepted
by normal model passively and actively; replacing the system call parameters; in-
serting no-effect system calls; creating equivalent variations of a given malicious
sequence. Almost with the same principles, the information hiding paradigm is
also applied to indicate that the stide technique is easy to be evaded [26].
Utilizing our proposed framework, it is very obvious that all these evading
strategies are to make the minimum foreign sequences of an intrusion as large
as possible so that eventually it grows beyond the length of stide detector win-
dow, making the stide detector ineffective. From the viewpoint of information
theory, the information gain in the intrusive dataset (which is manipulated by
mimicry attacks or information hiding techniques) is too small to be detected.
Furthermore, since these two techniques focus on applying stide to system call
sequences in the host-based systems with more or less strong assumptions, the
only conclusion that can be made is that the stide is not suitable for detect-
ing the mimicry attacks based on the system call sequences. Therefore, at this
point, no conclusion can be drawn about the influence of these techniques on the
efficiency of a general stide detector (with a ‘good ’ encoding replacing ‘system
call ’). Furthermore, from our following experimental results, the large quantity
of the minimum foreign sequences discovered in every intrusive dataset will,
to a large extent, discourage mimicry attacks and intrusion information hiding
techniques, because all of the minimum foreign sequences must be mimicked
and hidden to evade detection.
In addition, we found that it is possible to make stide inefficient by getting
control of one application and then nudging it to generate smaller minimum
common false positives during the run of an intrusion (Theorem 5). If the
quantity of the false positives are large enough during the intrusion, the stide
detector will be useless in detecting the intrusion due to the base-rate fallacy[2].
4.3.2 t-stide and variable length patterns
As variations of stide, t-stide and variable-length patterns are proposed in [28]
and [29], and both of them utilize the frequency information of each sequence.
t-stide is very similar to stide except that it discards infrequent sequences whose
frequency is smaller than a threshold t [28]. The performance of t-stide is found
to be unsatisfactory by the author. Using our framework, the obvious reason for
t-stide’s failure is that the discarded sequences will increase the incompleteness
of the training dataset, that will decrease its detection efficiency. Furthermore,
with the method of minimum foreign sequence discovery discussed later in sec-
tion 5.4, the negative conclusion regarding t-stide can be further explained by
comparing the MFSs in the intrusive dataset for stide and t-stide.
Since the principles for stide and variable-length patterns [29] are different,
their comparisons will be based on the detection performance by considering
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the fact that only the patterns (or sequences) are used in the detection phase.
As indicated in our framework, the minimum foreign sequence is the main char-
acteristic left in the audit trails for the sequence-related AID techniques. In the
principles of variable-length patterns, we noticed that if the minimum length of
the MFSs of an intrusion is larger than 1, the intrusion will be easily ignored
by variable-length patterns. For example, suppose that the normal model for
the variable-length method is {ABCD, CAE, FBD}. If the minimum foreign se-
quence of an intrusion is ‘DC’, and the intrusive audit trail is ‘ABCDCAEFBD’,
the intrusion will not be detected. As the experimental results in [29] are very
good, we suspect that the MFS of the chosen intrusions is 1, just like the ‘mis-
configuration’ for ‘wu-ftpd’ in our experiments described later.
4.3.3 The significance of locality frame count
For stide, following [28] [9], the anomaly value of a trace is derived from the
number of mismatches occurring in a temporally local region, called a local-
ity frame (LF). Then, a locality frame count (LFC) is used as a threshold to
determine whether the locality frame is anomalous in the trace.
Let us assume that the stide detector window is of length ω. Suppose that, in
a locality frame of a trace, there are at least nMFSs: MFS1,MFS2, . . . ,MFSn
with lengths smaller than ω, andMFSk has the minimum length lk among them.
Since by definition, one MFS can not completely include another MFS, the
minimum number of mismatches will take place when the MFS’s are maximally
overlapped, i.e., MFS2 starts one event later than MFS1, MFS3 starts one
event later than MFS2 and so on. In this pathological case, the minimum
number of anomalies detected in the LF should be ω − lk + n. Therefore, for
successful detection of the anomaly in the LF, we must have LFC 6 ω− lk+n.
From the above analysis, we can identify these ways to successfully detect
intrusions in an LF: (1) making the detector window larger; (2) making the
minimum foreign sequence smaller, and (3) making the number of MFSs in one
locality frame as large as possible to form a cluster of anomalies [9]. Since larger
detector window will degrade the efficiency of stide, the latter two options can
be considered to serve as a guideline for choosing proper lengths for LF and
LFC.
5 Applications
Apart from strengthening the comprehension of the inherent dynamics of stide-
like AID detectors, the formal framework can also be applied to accelerate the
training of stide-like AID detectors with less training audit trails, to identify the
precise context of an intrusion and so on. Other than evaluating the influence of
the completeness of training dataset on stide efficiency, two of its applications
will be described in detail: (1)trimming the normal dataset without losing effi-
ciency for a given detection performance (thus the training procedure is speed
up), and (2)identifying the intrusion contexts in the intrusive dataset.
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5.1 Experimental setup and datasets
Table 2: The dataset specifications.
Normal Intrusive No. of No. of
Datasets Datasets Traces System Calls
live-named-UNM —- 142 9230572
—- buffer overflow-1 3 969
—- buffer overflow-2 2 831
live-lpr-MIT —- 2703 2926304
—- lprcp 1001 165248
sendmail-CERT —- 294 1576086
—- syslog-local-1 6 1516
—- syslog-local-2 6 1574
—- syslog-remote-1 7 1861
—- syslog-remote-2 4 1553
—- cert-sm565a 3 275
—- cert-sm5x 8 1537
sendmail-UNM —- 346 1799764
—- decode 36 3067
—- forward loops 36 2569
—- sunsendmailcp 3 1119
syn-wu-ftpd —- 8 180315
—- misconfiguration 5 1363
syn-xlock-UNM —- 71 339177
—- buffer overflow-1 1 489
—- buffer overflow-2 1 460
For the convenience of comparison, the datasets [8] that are used in [28] [25]
have been used in our experiments as well. In addition, we have discarded the
normal datasets of several processes that are too small to use in our framework.
The normal and intrusive datasets for selected processes are specified in Table 2.
From the table, our selected datasets represent most processes and intrusions
into the processes. Furthermore, to analyze the characteristics of every intru-
sion, its intrusive dataset, even into the same process, is treated as an individual
dataset.
5.2 The influence of the completeness of training dataset
on stide efficiency
In this section, the influence of the completeness of the training dataset on the
efficiency of stide detectors will be evaluated. For that purpose, we regard the
normal dataset for every process to be complete for the normal model of the
process, and we induce incompleteness by splitting the normal dataset into a
training dataset and a test dataset. To remove any dependency, we choose the
training datasets with m varying sizes Size1, . . . , Sizem and n varying starting
points Pos1, . . . , Posn within the length of the normal dataset Σnml. To achieve
it, the normal dataset is treated as a continuous ring using wrap around of the
linear dataset. Given any splitting point Posi and any size Sizej, the part
from Posi to (Posi + Sizej)%|Σnml| is selected as Σtrn(i, j), and whatever
remains is chosen as the test dataset Σtst(i, j). Based on Σtrn(i, j) and Σtst(i, j),
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the completeness of the training dataset will be evaluated considering stide
efficiency.
On the other hand, in stide-like AID techniques, the frequency information of
the events in the training dataset is not utilized, so trimming the repeated events
(or sequences) in the training dataset is useful to economize the training time
without any loss of efficiency. In the trimming procedure, the critical sections
in a normal dataset are identified to produce a compact training dataset. One
of the requirements for the critical section is that the stide detectors trained
by it must be as efficient as when they are trained by the complete untrimmed
dataset. Finally, the most compact critical section in the normal dataset are
chosen for stide without sacrificing its efficiency.
To achieve it, we also develop two graphical tools to make it easy and conve-
nient to analyze the completeness of the training dataset, and the characteristics
of the datasets. They are described below.
5.2.1 MFS-MSS Average Curves
These curves are inspired by Theorem 6, which can be used to depict the in-
fluence of the completeness of the training dataset on the detection efficiency
graphically. At the same time, our objective for these curves is to evaluate the
dynamics in stide efficiency with the completeness of training dataset, thus, we
only concern about the size of training dataset. For this reason, the average
values for |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) and |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) for a given training
data size Sizej (1 6 j 6 m) are first calculated:
|MSSmin|avg(j)
=
1
n
∗
n∑
i=1
|MSS|min(Σtst(i, j)|Σtrn(i, j)) (12)
|MFSmin|avg(j)
=
1
n
∗
n∑
i=1
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn(i, j)) (13)
Then, we plot the average values of |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) and |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
against the corresponding sizes of the dataset Σtrn. We call the resulting graphs
as MFS-MSS Average Curves (MMAC) (Figure 3).
5.2.2 MFS-MSS Matrix
Let us first introduce a new concept ‘critical section’. Within context of stide, for
a splitting point Posi, Sizej is a critical section CS(i, λ) if |MSS|min(Σtst(i, j)|Σtrn(i, j)) ≥
λ but |MSS|min(Σtst(i, j − 1)|Σtrn(i, j − 1)) < λ. Obviously, the critical sec-
tion is indispensable to provide stide detectors with the detection performance
λ. Other than the critical section CS(i, λ), the remaining part of the normal
dataset can be discarded as it has negligible effect on the stide detection effi-
ciency.
18
The MFS-MSS Matrix (MMM) is defined in order to help identify the critical
sections in the normal dataset with respect to the predefined detection perfor-
mance λ. In the matrix, the columns (the horizontal axis) are defined by the
splitting sizes of the training dataset {Size1, Size2, . . . , Sizem}, and the rows
(the vertical axis) are defined by the splitting points of the training dataset
{Pos1, Pos2, . . . , Posn} (as in Figure 4). According to our proposed formal
framework (especially from Eqn (10) and Theorem 6), an entry MMM(i, j) in
an MMMmatrix will be labeled as ‘efficient’ if |MSS|min(Σtst(i, j)|Σtrn(i, j)) >
λ, otherwise, it is labeled as ‘inefficient’. Furthermore, for every specific pair
of Posi and Sizej, if MMM(i, j) is inefficient but MMM(i, j + 1) is efficient,
the transition from the inefficient entry MMM
(i, j) to the efficient entry MMM(i, j + 1) is named as an efficiency transi-
tion in the MMM matrix. From the efficiency transition, it can be concluded
that the section in Σnml from Posi to (Posi + Sizej+1)%|Σnml|
4 is critical for
building efficient stide detectors, i.e., it is a critical section CS(i, λ).
After identifying the critical sections for all splitting points, we choose the
most compact critical sectionMCCS(λ)(= CS(i, λ)) in the normal dataset
as the training dataset for stide. As its name implies, for any other critical
section CS(k, λ) (i 6= k), |MCCS(λ)| ≤ |CS(k, λ)|. Since the redundant parts
in the normal dataset can be trimmed by usingMCCS(λ), the training time for
the stide detectors can be substantially reduced without sacrificing the detection
performance. As an added benefit, the size of MCCS(λ) in the normal dataset
provides an intuitive measure of the complexity of a process. This is because,
intuitively, with respect to the same detection performance, the more complex
the process is, the larger MCCS(λ) is. Furthermore, this technique for dataset
trimming can be utilized in other domains as well, such as information retrieval
and computer forensic.
Effect of the trimming scheme As mentioned earlier, in order to be valid,
any trimming of the training dataset must not lead to any loss in the efficiency
of stide detectors. That our trimming procedure indeed satisfies the criterion is
shown by the Theorem 7.
Theorem 7 Let Σcstrn denote the critical section, and Σ
cs
tst the remaining part in
the normal dataset. Thus, Σcstrn⊙Σ
cs
tst = Σnml. The future normal dataset is de-
noted as Σnew. Then, for all (known and unknown) intrusions withMFS(Σint|Σnml⊙
Σnew) 6 λ,
|MSS|min(Σnew |Σnml) > |MFS|min(Σint|Σnml ⊙ Σnew)
⇒ |MSS|min(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew|Σ
cs
trn)
> |MFS|min(Σint|Σnml ⊙ Σnew)
Proof 2 In the trimming scheme, we assume that |MSS|min
(Σcstst|Σ
cs
trn) = λ (> 0), i.e., the detection performance of the stide detector built
4 It is done in a wrap-round fashion as the normal dataset splitting policy in the same
application.
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by the critical section is stable at λ to detect intrusions that cause MSSs smaller
than λ. From its definition, |MSS|min(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew|Σ
cs
trn) is affected by the
foreign sequence(s) S (S ∈ MFSmin(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew |Σ
cs
trn)) under the following
two scenarios:
CASE 1: S ∈ SS(Σcstst);
S ∈ SS(Σcstst), S 6∈ SS(Σ
cs
trn)
⇒ |S| = λ+ 1
⇒ |MSS|min(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew|Σ
cs
trn) = λ
⇒ |MSS|min(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew|Σ
cs
trn)
> |MFS|min(Σint|Σnml ⊙ Σnew)
CASE 2: S 6∈ SS(Σcstst);
S 6∈ SS(Σcstst), S 6∈ SS(Σ
cs
trn)
⇒ S ⊂ Σnew, S 6⊂ Σnml
⇒ |MSS|min(Σnew |Σnml) = |S| − 1
⇒ |MSS|min(Σnew |Σnml) = |MSS|min(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew|Σ
cs
trn)
⇒ |MSS|min(Σ
cs
tst ⊙ Σnew |Σ
cs
trn)
> |MFS|min(Σint|Σnml ⊙ Σnew)
Based on the results under these two scenarios, the theorem is proved.
5.3 Experimental evaluations
The splitting procedure in our application works as follows. The length of the
training dataset Sizej is varied from 1 to 99% of the normal dataset, with a
step of 7%, and the remaining portion of the normal dataset is designated as
the test dataset. The splitting position Posi is also varied dynamically from
1% to 99% of the normal dataset, using wrap around, with a step of 7%. Thus,
m = n = 15. The maximum length for MSSs in any test dataset is kept fixed
at N=25 (as all the MSSs and MFSs obtained are well within this limit).
In our experiments, the following aspects of the framework will be evaluated:
A) The influence of the completeness of the training dataset on the MFSs in
the intrusive dataset;
B) The influence of the completeness of the training dataset on the MSSs in
the test dataset;
C) The effectiveness of the trimming procedure, and the related graphical
tools.
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5.3.1 Evaluating the completeness of the training dataset
In Figure 3, the MFS-MSS average curves for processes are illustrated5. From
these curves, the varying sensitivity of the stide detectors to the complete-
ness of the training dataset is obvious. For processes ‘named’, ’xlock’ and ‘lpr’
from MIT, the efficiency of stide detectors is quite sensitive to the complete-
ness of the training dataset. For process ‘sendmails’ from CERT, the efficient
stide detectors can be obtained even with a small size of the training dataset.
At the same time, the minimum foreign sequences of the intrusive dataset
are not affected that much by the completeness of the training dataset since
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst) is small (less than 2 ) for ‘named’, ‘lpr’ and ‘send-
mail’ from CERT (Equation 10). However, if the MFS(s) of an intrusion is
larger than 2, such as ’decode-280’, the influence of the minimum common false
positive sequences in the intrusive dataset can be observed clearly as the com-
pleteness of the normal dataset increases. It is worth noting that the answer to
the ‘Why 6?’ [24] question is provided explicitly by Figure 3.d.
General speaking, the degree of sensitivity of the stide detectors to the com-
pleteness of the training dataset may be influenced by the complexity of the pro-
cesses and/or the audit trails collection tools. If the function of a process is sim-
ple, the complete training dataset is easy to collect, and the detection efficiency
is more influenced by the intrusion characteristics |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙Σtst)
(Theorem 5). Otherwise, the completeness of the training dataset is hard to
be guaranteed, and the stide detector is more sensitive to the completeness of
the training dataset. In other words, stide is very efficient to detect intrusions
into a process with simple function, but its efficiency will be deteriorated when
detecting a complex process. For instance, stide is not appropriate to detect the
intrusions in Internet since the traffic behaviors in Internet are very dynamic,
and even evolved with time.
5.3.2 Identifying critical sections using MMM
In the MMM matrix, the efficiency of every entry is indicated by its darkness,
which is defined by the value |MSS|min
(Σtst(i, j)|Σtrn(i, j)) − λ. As in Figure 4, the darker elements of the matrix
indicate the efficient entries, and the lighter elements of the matrix indicate the
inefficient entries. Therefore, based on Theorem 6, the darker the entry in the
MMM matrix is, the more possibility to train efficient stide detectors from the
training dataset determined by the entry (i,j). Furthermore, for every splitting
point, the efficiency transition is clearly visible as it is the transition from a
lighter entry to the first darker one.
In our experiments, we let λ = 6. From these efficiency transitions in the
MMM matrices (Figure 4), the critical sections in the normal dataset for any
5For clarity, in this figure, we have grouped the intrusions which have the same MFS
sequences with the increase of the completeness of the training dataset. For the same reason,
some MFS sequences will be organized in a table if they are too near to be distinguishable
from their curves, such as the table in Figure 3.d.
21
Table 3: The most compact critical sections when λ = 6.
Process MCCS(λ)(%) |MCCS(λ)|
‘named’ from UNM [92, 100]∪[0, 84] 92% - - 8492126
‘lpr’ from MIT [85, 100]∪[0, 63] 78% - - 2282517
‘sendmail’ from CERT [92, 100]∪[0, 7] 15% - - 236412
‘sendmail’ from UNM [64, 100]∪[0, 14] 50% - - 899882
‘wu-ftpd’ from UNM [92, 100]∪[0, 28] 36% - - 64913
‘xlock’ from UNM [71, 100]∪[0, 70] 99% - - 335785
process can be identified easily for every splitting point. For example, for the
process ‘lpr’, at the splitting point Pos12 = 78%, CS(12, 6) = [78%, 100%] ∪
[0, 63%]. Finally, the most compact critical section is gotten for every process
(e.g., for ‘lpr’, MCCS(6) = [85%, 100%] ∪ [0, 63%]). In our experiments, the
MCCSs for various processes in the normal datasets are shown in Table 3.
Obviously, the beginning part [0, 7%] and the end part [92%, 100%] are included
in all these most compact critical sections. As discussed in [17], the beginning
and end transactions of a process are critical in building the normal behavior
model, and thus affect the stide efficiency.
From the critical section set for every normal dataset in MMM matrix, the
sensitivity of the efficiency of stide detectors to the constitution and complete-
ness of the training dataset can be identified more meticulously. Furthermore,
from the actual size (i.e., not the percentage) ofMCCS(λ) in the normal dataset
of a process, we can get a rough indication of the complexity of the process. For
example, from Table 3, we can infer the following order in terms of complex-
ity among various processes in the experimental datasets: “wu-ftpd 6 sendmail
from CERT 6 xlock 6 sendmail from UNM 6 lpr from MIT 6 named”.
5.4 Identifying the intrusion context
By identifying the context associated with each alarm generated by the stide
detector, it is possible to separate true alarms from false alarms. This then can
be useful in designing more accurate detectors, and reducing (or removing) the
false alarms.
5.4.1 Foreign sequences graphs
To identify the intrusion context, the intrusion dataset can be processed in two
ways: (1) splitting it into blocks and evaluating every block; (2) evaluating every
event in the intrusive dataset. We use the second option because the splitting
process has the potential to break the foreign sequences, producing spurious and
misleading anomalous sequences. To evaluate the impact of every event ei, we
determine the Foreign Sequence Length of ei or FSL(ei), which is the length of
the first precedent foreign sequence that ends with ei (Algorithm.1). We plot
the values of FSL(ei) against the index i of the event to generate a graph called
the foreign sequence graph (FSG).
According to our proposed framework, the MFSs can be determined from
the foreign sequence graph as follows. In practice, if an MFS in one intrusive
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Algorithm 1 Calculating the foreign sequence lengths for all the events in an
intrusive dataset.
Require: The event sequence of the process e1, e2, . . . , ep; and the stide self model series
stide1, stide2, . . . , stideN ;
for i=1 to p do
seq=NULL; FSL(ei) = N + 1;
for j=0 to N-1 do
If i-j60 break;
Insert ei−j to seq as the first element;
if seq is-not-in stide(j+1) then
FSL(ei) = length(seq); break;
end if
end for
end for
Output FSL(e1), FSL(e2), . . . , FSL(ep)
process is eaea+1 . . . eb (b− a+ 1 6 N), it will be identified by the lowest point
in its foreign sequence graph, which is expressed as FSL(eb) = b− a+ 1, since
FSL(eb−1) > b−a+1, and FSL(eb+1) > b−a+1. Thus, the precedent b−a+1
events constitute the intrusion context, that is, the minimum foreign sequence.
5.4.2 Minimum foreign sequences in FSGs
According to the definition of minimum foreign sequences, the non-MFS foreign
sequences are formed by augmenting minimum foreign sequences. For example,
suppose that an MFS is x1, x2, . . . , xl, the foreign sequence can be constituted
as follows: y1 . . . ymx1x2 . . . xlym+1 . . . ym+n, where, m > 0, n > 0, y1 . . . ym and
ym+1 . . . ym+n are not foreign sequences. Since these two parts in the foreign
sequence provide no additional information in comparison with the MFS in them
[23], they will be filtered out before further analysis.
Fortunately, in the generation of the foreign sequence graph (Algorithm 1),
the prefix sequence y1 . . . ym is filtered out automatically. Therefore, to collect
the minimum foreign sequence, only the suffix sequence ym+1 . . . ym+n needs
to be eliminated. The method to filter out the suffix sequence is trivial: if
FSL(ei) = FSL(ei−1) + 1, the foreign sequence identified by FSL(ei) will be
filtered out since it is included in the foreign sequence identified by FSL(ei−1).
As stated before, the false alarms in the intrusive dataset or in the test
dataset can be identified and analyzed as well by the intrusion context identifi-
cation scheme. In summary, the scheme will be useful to study the characteris-
tics of the intrusions, to remove the false alarms in the detection phase, and to
improve the efficiency of the AID detection techniques. However, every coin has
two sides. The identified intrusion context can be utilized to design smarter in-
trusions, such as the information hiding techniques [26] and the mimicry attacks
[27].
5.5 Experimental evaluations
In the experiments, the following aspects about the scheme will be evaluated:
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A) The effectiveness of the foreign sequence graph, and how to identify the
intrusion context;
B) The significance of the minimum foreign sequences in the intrusive dataset.
5.5.1 Identifying the intrusion context from FSGs
The following figures (Figure 5) summarize the foreign sequence graphs for every
intrusion into the chosen processes. For the convenience of comparison, some
FSG graphs are compressed into one subfigure, and their borders are split with
vertical lines for different intrusive datasets. To easily identify the boundaries,
we introduce dummy values of FSL = −4 between different intrusive datasets,
and FSL = −1 between different processes in one dataset.
From these foreign sequence graphs, we can make the following observations:
• Some intrusions cannot be detected in the first (beginning) stage by stide-
like anomaly detectors since there are no foreign sequences in that stage,
such as the buffer overflow into ‘named’; yet some intrusions can be de-
tected in the first stage, such as the ‘lprcp’ into ‘lpr from MIT’;
• Different runs of the same attack (intrusion) have almost the same foreign
sequence graphs (or intrusive characteristics), such as the sunsendmailcp
in which the three different runs (10763, 10801, 10814) have the same
foreign sequence graph;
• For different intrusions into one process, the foreign sequence graphs are
not the same, and they are intrusion-specific. Therefore, to detect all
intrusions into a resource, one specific detection strategy (such as the
stide detector with defined length) is not enough;
• For most of the intrusions, there are obvious precursors at the beginning
of the anomalous events, and some of them are manifested by the foreign
sequences with larger length. It hints at the existence of a tradeoff be-
tween the MMTA (Mean Time To Alarm) of anomaly detectors and their
efficiency (reflected by the length of sequences).
5.5.2 Minimum foreign sequences
The minimum foreign sequences for ‘decode’ are listed below. From a look at
the list, the answer to the ‘why 6? ’ problem is obvious (1:exit, 2:fork, 5:open,
6:close, 19:lseek, 95:connect, 112:vtrace).
• decode-280
process 283: 2-95-6-6-95-5
• decode-314
process 317: 112-6, 6-19, 2-95-1, 2-95-6-6-95-5.
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From the total number of non-duplicated MFSs in every intrusive dataset
(Figure 6), we know that (1) the detector window DW = 2 is enough to detect
most of the intrusions; (2) the intrusion ‘decode-280 ’ leads to the magic number
6 for stide; (3) if the detection window DW > 7, the efficiency of stide detectors
will not be improved much as expected.
Table 4: Shared Minimum Foreign Sequences by the same intrusion into the
same process.
Intrusion No. of MFSs No. of
of Each Run Shared MFSs
decode {2,5} 2
buffer overflow into xlock {68,68} 68
buffer overflow into named {59,38} 33
sunsendmailcp {24,24,24} 24
forward loops {33,11,30,33,4} 0
syslog-local {55,71} 52
syslog-remote {78,42} 42
In addition, we also note that different runs of the same intrusion into one
resource will share most of the minimum foreign sequences (Table 4). It is quite
notable that different runs of ‘sunsendmailcp’ have the same set of minimum
foreign sequences. This discovery benefits the research on anomaly-based intru-
sion detection because the diversity of different runs of the same intrusion is not
too large to design one specific (or ad-hoc) IDS system for each of its runs. At
the same time, it strengthens two assertions that the foreign sequence graphs
are intrusion-specific, and that different runs of the same intrusion have almost
the same characteristics.
Also, the large quantity of minimum foreign sequences given in Table 4,
especially for the intrusion ‘buffer overflow’, will discourage the mimicry attacks
[27] and the information hiding paradigm greatly. This is because all the large
quantity of MFSs must be mimicked to achieve a successful mimicry attack. In
addition, after a careful manual identification, the minimum foreign sequences
can also be applied to construct the ‘intrusion signatures ’ to be applied in
signature-based intrusion detection techniques.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, a general framework is proposed to determine the operational
limits of stide detectors. Tan and Maxion [25] in their attempt to solve the “Why
six?” problem, identified the length of the minimum foreign sequence in the audit
data as a lower bound for the length of stide detectors. Our work complements
their effort by showing the effect of completeness of the normal model on stide’s
performance, and establishing an upper bound for the length of the detector.
In addition to generalizing Tan and Maxion’s results, this framework provides
a formal ground for analyzing future stide-like AID detectors that are based
on sequence analysis, by exploring the dynamics of the various factors affecting
operational limits of stide, i.e. the false positives and true positives. Based
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on the formal framework, the foundations of several work related to stide are
interpreted in a logical way.
The experiments we conducted not only validate our theoretical results, they
also provide further insights by clearly showing the inter-dependencies of the var-
ious factors affecting stide’s performance, i.e., the influence of completeness of
the training dataset on stide efficiency is evaluated. The conclusion on the com-
pleteness evaluation is that stide is not appropriate for dynamic scenarios, such
as the traffic behaviors in Internet. Then, two applications of our framework
are also designed to demonstrate the usefulness of our framework. One is the
trimming procedure for the normal dataset, in which the redundant parts in the
normal dataset are filtered out for further analysis. To achieve them, two graph-
ical tools are designed to identify the influence and the most compact critical
section: MFS-MSS Average Curve (MMAC) and MFS-MSS matrix (MMM).
From the MMAC curves, the influence of the completeness of the training
dataset on the MSSs in the test dataset and the MFSs in the intrusive dataset are
analyzed. The existence of the minimum common false positive sequences are
also confirmed in the MMAC curves. At a finer granularity, the MMM matrix is
utilized to find the most compact critical section within the normal dataset for a
specific detection performance λ. The MMAC curves and the MMM matrix also
provide an intuitive indication of the complexity of the corresponding process.
In this framework, the questions related to the ‘Why 6? ’ problem can be
answered clearly, such as the question in [25], ‘to what extent can we establish a
link between detectable anomalies and intrusive behaviors? ’, and the answer lies
in Theorem 6. After analyzing the influence of the completeness of the training
dataset of a process on the efficiency of the stide detectors, we can determine
whether stide is appropriate for detecting any intrusion into that process.
The second application of the framework, which is first introduced here, is
the intrusion context identification in an intrusive dataset using the foreign se-
quence graphs. From the minimum foreign sequences of intrusions, the following
findings, which will benefit the research on anomaly-based intrusion detection,
are reported:
1. Different runs of an intrusion almost have the same characteristics;
2. Different intrusions into one process will cause different anomalies in the
intrusive datasets;
3. Most of the intrusions have precursors, which are useful to provide short
MMTA;
4. Some intrusions can not be detected in the first stage when no anomalies
are caused.
5. There is diminishing rate of return in terms of efficiency with the increase
of the detector window size.
Limitations of the Framework. However, while using the proposed frame-
work, we should bear in mind certain limitations of the framework. These are
briefly stated below.
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1. Like any AID technique, the framework is based on the assumption that
any anomaly in the intrusive dataset is an indication of an intrusion into
the resource. Even though the assumption is reasonable under most cir-
cumstances, it is possible that a non-malicious access that deviates from
the normal behavior will be detected as an intrusion. On the other hand,
if an intrusion can successfully mimic the normal behaviors, then no AID
technique can detect such an intrusion[26].
2. The framework specifically deals with stide-like AID techniques which
assumes that intrusions are manifested in the sequences of system calls and
tries to detect them by a systematic analysis of such sequences. Therefore
it may not be appropriate to apply it to all possible intrusions or detection
techniques [27] [26].
In our future work, the framework will be further evaluated by the datasets
under different environments, e.g. the networks and the windows platform.
Then, the definitions for effective, complete and efficient anomaly-based intru-
sion detectors will be generalized to other sequence-based AID techniques. As
a practical and promising method to analyze the intrusion characteristics, the
mechanisms for intrusion context identification will also be extended to other
AID techniques in our further study.
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(a) Process ‘named’.
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(b) Process ‘lpr’ from MIT.
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(f) Process ‘xlock’.
Figure 3: MFS-MSS average curves for different processes.
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Figure 4: MFS-MSS Matrix for different processes (λ = 6).
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The FSG for the Intrusion 'buffer overflow' into 'named'
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The FSG for the Intrusion 'decode' into 'sendmail-UNM'
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UNM, and the Intrusion is decode.
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The FSG for the Intrusion 'buffer overflow' into 'xlock'
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Figure 5: Foreign sequence graphs for different intrusions and processes.
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MFS Length 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 sum
named-1 5 34 11 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 59
named-2 5 19 6 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
lpr-1 26 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
sm-cert-1 3 20 13 5 1 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 55
sm-cert-2 3 27 20 5 2 3 4 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 71
sm-cert-3 3 30 20 5 2 3 4 2 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 78
sm-cert-4 2 9 9 4 1 3 4 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 42
sm-cert-5 0 8 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
sm-cert-6 0 23 25 17 6 4 5 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 96
sm-unm-1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
sm-unm-2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5
sm-unm-3 0 11 9 5 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 33
sm-unm-4 0 3 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 11
sm-unm-5 0 11 9 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 30
sm-unm-6 0 10 10 5 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 33
sm-unm-7 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
sm-unm-8 0 7 7 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 24
sm-unm-9 0 7 7 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 24
sm-unm-10 0 7 7 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 24
ftpd-1 3 34 14 8 4 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
xlock-1 10 41 8 2 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
xlock-2 10 41 8 2 2 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68
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named-1,2: the buffer overflow-1,2
sm-cert-1..6: syslog-local-1,2, syslog-local-3,4 sm565a and sm5x
sm-unm-1..10: decode-280,314, forward loops-1,2,3,4,5, sunsendmailcp-10763,10801,10814
ftpd-1:  misconfiguration
xlock-1,2: buffer overflow-1,2
Figure 6: The number of Minimum Foreign Sequences (non-duplicated) in all
intrusive datasets.
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A Proofs of some Theorems
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof 3 Assume that S ∈MFSmin(Σtgt|Σref ). Thus, |S| = |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref ).
From the definition of MFS(Σtgt|Σref ), S ∈ FRGN(Σtgt|Σref ), and there ex-
ists an 1-order subsequence S′ ∈ SELF (Σtgt|Σref ) at least considering that
FRGN(Σtgt|Σref )∪SELF (Σtgt|Σref ) = SS(Σtgt). Therefore, (S
′ ∈ SELF (Σtgt|Σref ))∧
(S ∈ SS(Σtgt))∧ (S <1 S
′)∧ (S 6∈ SELF (Σtgt|Σref )) = True, and we can con-
clude that S′ ∈MSS(Σtgt|Σref ).
Then, using proof by contradiction to prove that S′ ∈MSSmin(Σtgt|Σref ). If
S′ 6∈MSSmin(Σtgt|Σref ), there must be another sequence S
′′ ∈MSSmin(Σtgt|Σref ),
and |S′′| < |S′|. Following above deduction, we can determine that there is one
S′′′ ∈MFS(Σtgt|Σref ), and S
′′′ <1 S
′′. Considering |S| = |S′|+ 1 and |S′′′| =
|S′′|+1, we get |S′′′| < |S|, which contradicts to |S| = |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) as
S′′′ ∈MFS(Σtgt|Σref ).
Considering that S ∈ MFSmin(Σtgt|Σref ), S
′ ∈ MSSmin(Σtgt|Σref ), and
|S| = |S′|+ 1, the following equation is held:
|MSS|min(Σtgt|Σref ) = |MFS|min(Σtgt|Σref )− 1
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof 4 From the definitions, we know that:
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) = min({l|l > 0;SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn, l) 6= Φ})
(1) If ω > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn), then,
SS(Σint, ω)− SS(Σtrn, ω) 6= Φ =⇒ TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω) 6= Φ
Hence, the stide detector of length ω built from Σtrn is effective w.r.t. Σint.
(2) If the stide detector with the length ω built by Σtrn is effective w.r.t. Σint,
then,
TPSS(Σint|Σtrn, ω) 6= Φ =⇒ SS(Σint, ω)− SS(Σtrn, ω) 6= Φ
=⇒ ω > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof 5 From the definitions, we know that:
|MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) = max({l|l > 0;SS(Σtst, l)− SS(Σtrn, l) = Φ})
(1) If ω ≤ |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn), then,
SS(Σtst, ω)− SS(Σtrn, ω) = Φ =⇒ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω) = Φ
Hence, the stide detector with the length ω built by Σtrn is complete w.r.t. Σtst.
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(2) If the stide detector with the length ω built by Σtrn is complete w.r.t. Σtst,
then,
FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, ω) = Φ =⇒ SS(Σtst, ω)− SS(Σtrn, ω) = Φ
=⇒ ω ≤ |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn)
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof 6 From the MFS definition,
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) = min({l|l > 0;SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn, l) 6= Φ})
The foreign sequence length vector for Σtrn and Σint is
FSLV (Σint|Σtrn) = {l|l > 0; SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn, l) 6= Φ}
For ∀l ∈ FSLV (Σint|Σtrn),
SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn, l) 6= Φ
⇔ ∃S(S ∈ (SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn, l)))
⇔ ∃S(S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn, l))
⇔ ∃S(S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn, l) ∧ (S ∈ SS(Σtst, l) ∨ S 6∈ SS(Σtst, l)))
⇔ ∃S((S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn, l) ∧ S ∈ SS(Σtst, l)) ∨ (S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtst, l)))
⇔ ∃S((S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn, l) ∧ S ∈ SS(Σtst, l)) ∨ (S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ (SS(Σtrn, l) ∨ SS(Σtst, l))))
⇔ ∃S((S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S ∈ (SS(Σtst, l)− SS(Σtrn, l))) ∨ (S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l)))
⇔ ∃S((S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S ∈ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l)) ∨ (S ∈ SS(Σint, l) ∧ S 6∈ SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l)))
⇔ ∃S(S ∈ (SS(Σint, l) ∩ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l)) ∨ S ∈ (SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l)))
⇔ ∃S(S ∈ ((SS(Σint, l) ∩ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l)) ∪ (SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l))))
⇔ SS(Σint, l) ∩ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l) 6= Φ ∨ SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l) 6= Φ
Hence,
FSLV (Σint|Σtrn) = {l|l > 0;SS(Σint, l) ∩ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l) 6= Φ} ∪ {l|l > 0;SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l) = Φ}
Finally,
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn)
= min(FSLV (Σint|Σtrn))
= min({l|SS(Σint, l) ∩ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l) 6= Φ} ∪ {l|SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l) 6= Φ})
= min(min({l|SS(Σint, l) ∩ FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l) 6= Φ}),
min({l|SS(Σint, l)− SS(Σtrn ⊙ Σtst, l) 6= Φ}))
= min(|CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn), |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst))
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A.5 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof 7 If |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > 1,
∀l(1 ≤ l ≤ |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn), FPSS(Σtst|Σtrn, l) = Φ) (14)
Furthermore, according to the definition of CFPS,
|CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) (15)
(⇐=) If |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst), there exist effi-
cient stide detectors for datasets Σtrn, Σtst and Σint.
|MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst)
⇒ |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > 1
⇒ |CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn)
⇒ |CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst)
⇒ |MFS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) = |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst)
⇒ |MFS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) ≤ |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn)
From Theorem 4, there exist efficient stide detectors under this scenario.
(=⇒) If there exist efficient stide detectors for Σtrn, Σtst and Σint, |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) >
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst).
To apply the proof by contradiction, let us assume |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) <
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst).
(§1) If |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) = 0,
From the MFS definition, |MFS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > 1 > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn).
Based on Theorem 4, there does not exist efficient stide detectors, and that is
contradict with our statement. So, |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) < |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn⊙
Σtst) is not correct.
(§2) If |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) > 1,
(2.a) If |CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) > |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst),
From equation (10), |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) = |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn⊙Σtst). Fur-
thermore, we assume |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst) > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn),
therefore
|MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn)
(2.b) If |CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) < |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn ⊙ Σtst),
From Eqn.10, |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) = |CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn), and Eqn.(15),
|CFPS|min(Σint,Σtst|Σtrn) > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn)
⇒ |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn) > |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn).
From (2.a), (2.b) and Theorem 4, there are no efficient stide detectors, and that
is contradict to the statement. Therefore, |MSS|min(Σtst|Σtrn) < |MFS|min(Σint|Σtrn⊙
Σtst) is not correct.
Based on (1) and (2), the theorem is proved.
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